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N A T IO N A L  T R A N S P O R T A T IO N  SAFETY BO ARD
The National Transportation Safety Board was established by 
Congress in the Department of Transportation Act of 1966. The 
safety board’s basic functions include the investigation of major trans­
portation accidents in all modes of transportation and the execution of 
special studies of safety problems which influence casualties in trans­
portation. The safety board is made up of a chairman and four members, 
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The chairman 
of the safety board is John H. Reed, former governor of the state of 
Maine. The safety board develops recommendations in transportation 
safety which are directed to the administrations of the Department of 
Transportation and other nationally important institutions which in­
fluence transportation safety.
SAFE TY BO ARD  A D O P T S S T U D Y — C O M P A T IB IL IT Y  
O F STA N D A R D S FO R DRIVERS, VEHICLES A N D  
H IG H W A Y S
Mutually Compatible Definitions of Performance Largely Absent for 
Systems A nalysis
In 1969 the safety board adopted what we believe to be a very 
significant study titled, “ Compatibility of Standards for Drivers, Ve­
hicles, and Highways.”  This study described the wide range of stand­
ards which, assembled, constitute the functional definition of the 
highway and the vehicle operating system. It has been appreciated 
for some time that the safety performance of drivers, roads, and 
highways was only poorly defined, if compared with the degree of 
definition and specification found in other well-developed systems, 
such as aerospace systems. The problem was strongly emphasized, 
however, when an effort was made to employ system analysis and 
system design in connection with the New York State Safety Car
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Project of 1966. This project was a precursor of the present Experi­
mental Safety Vehicle Authority of the Department of Transportation. 
That early effort highlighted a major problem of the highway trans­
portation system. The study report of that project said:
“ . . . The vehicle’s performance cannot be defined except in rela­
tion to (poorly defined safety performance parameters of the 
driver and road). . . .  It is only in terms of mutually compatible 
definitions of performance that the different elements of a traffic 
system can be assembled and seen as an operational system.”
This statement is, of course, completely true for any type of 
system subject to the systems approach. The safety board’s study showed 
in detail that the mutually compatible definitions of performance were 
largely absent. The study described the nature of the incompatibility 
in considerable detail and discussed the problems of organization which 
would have to be solved if compatible standards were ever to be pro­
duced.
Systems Approach and Defining and Interrelating 
Compatible Functions— Standards
Under the systems approach, the construction of a functional sys­
tem depends upon defining and interrelating the necessary functions. 
If the methods of defining these functions (let’s call them standards 
for the time being) are technically incompatible, or if the standards 
merely describe the structure of the system rather than its function, 
then it will be almost impossible to employ the standards to describe 
an integrated operating system. W e cannot assess the mode of opera­
tion which was intended by the designers, nor can we analyze the 
operation actually produced, without introducing novel methods of 
analysis of a nonstandard nature. The result of this difficulty is that 
we are led to consider the operation of the system mostly in terms of 
the effectiveness of its isolated parts. Inevitably, we must make our 
decisions of highway and vehicle design, and driver selection on a 
narrow basis. This leads to hazardous and inefficient operations.
E XA M PLE S O F D IF FIC U LT IE S PR O D U C E D  BY 
IN C O M P A T IB L E  STA N D A R D S
Standards Defined
Now, that is a theoretical statement of the difficulty produced by 
incompatible standards. A  few examples will serve to show what we 
are talking about in practical engineering terms.
First, we are considering under the word “ standard” any form 
of specification, standard, definition, or description which serves to
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describe the combined operation of the driver, the vehicle and the 
highway, whether voluntary or regulatory. W e include, for example, 
the Snellen eye chart used to test the visual acuity of drivers. W e 
include the functional description of instrumented anthropometric 
dummies which represent the human body in crash injury tests. W e 
include crash-test objects which represent objects along the highway 
which may be struck by vehicles. W e include highway design policies. 
There appear to be hundreds of such standards. W e are not concerned 
with those elements of description which are internal to one part of 
the system, such as the compressive strength of concrete, the voltage 
used for vehicle light, the driver’s eyeglass prescription, or the specifi­
cation of his hearing aid.
Incompatibility of Standards of Rear View Mirror Visibility and 
Standards for Geometric Design
The first example describes a problem which is on the way toward 
solution in the case of passenger cars. I refer to the incompatibility be­
tween standards of rear view mirror visibility and standards for the 
geometric design of highways. Acceptable highway designs include 
many illustrations of merging or weaving situations in which a 
vehicle can potentially be overtaken by traffic approaching from the 
left or right rear. Half a dozen are shown in the blue book of AASH O. 
Tangential entries are allowable on the interstate system, and indeed, 
are the normal method of entry to high speed lanes. Notice, however, 
that such standards are not numerical descriptions of a functional re­
quirement, but simply layouts of acceptable design. There is no state­
ment in these layouts of any assumed or intended rear vision character­
istics of vehicles which will use the roads.
On the vehicle side, we have “ Federal Motor Vehicle Safety 
Standard 111” which specifies, “ Requirements for rear view mirrors 
to provide the driver with a clear and reasonably unobstructed view 
to the rear.” This standard is numerical in nature, producing with an 
inside rear view mirror a view to the rear of at least 20 degrees 
horizontal angle. However, since this view may be totally obscured by 
interior loading which is not disapproved under the standard, an out­
side rear view mirror on the driver’s side is also required. The per­
formance standard for the outside rear view mirror is stated in terms 
of points and distances from the driver’s eyes which must be visible in 
the rear view mirror.
It can be shown by calculation that within the standard layouts 
of AASHO, one vehicle can approach another vehicle from the rear 
in such a way that the rear vehicle cannot reliably be detected by the
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forward driver using his rear view mirror. Thus, the forward driver, 
if he perceives this difficulty, ceases to employ the rear view mirror 
and will turn to the rear, looking through the left side windows of 
the vehicle (or the right side where merging into the left lane is 
permitted). W e all know the hazard which this produces. One cannot 
look to the rear and forward at the same time. O f course, there are 
also no windshield wiping or defrosing standards for the vehicle side 
windows which must be used in this situation. Most important, the 
existence of these standards has not served to show that a hazard 
existed, and thus the standard is of little use in creating a safe system.
This difficulty may be greatly alleviated by the current D O T  
proposal to alter the rear visibility standard so that it will, in effect, 
require periscopic rear view mirrors for passenger cars. The rear vision 
angle may increase by 1976 from about 20 degrees to about 80 degrees. 
W e do not know whether this proposal was assisted by the safety 
board’s study, but we would like to think that it was.
Incompatibility of Standards of Driver Vision and 
Traffic Sign Legibility
Consider the need for technical coordination of standards which 
describe driver vision capability and traffic signing legibility. Systematic 
control of the interaction between drivers and signs requires at least 
consideration of four matters: driver visual acuity, traffic sign letter- 
sizes, placement of signs relative to highway features, and allowable 
speed. The lack of compatible definitions makes it unnecessarily diffi­
cult to analyze these factors at any given highway location.
The 1967 vision requirements for motor vehicle operators show 
a variety of visual acuity ranging from 20/40 to 20/70. The require­
ments for visual acuity are such that several states now license some 
drivers who are unable to detect words on signs until they are much 
closer to the sign than other drivers licensed in the same states. It 
also appears that some states having very high speed limits also employ 
the lower standard for visual acuity, while other states having low 
speed limits employ the higher standard of visual acuity.
This driver vision standard, employing the Snellen eye chart, is 
based upon the tested ability of persons to read letters similar to 
those of highway signs. A  person having 20/20 vision is able to read 
at 20 feet, letters of a height that a person having normal (youthful) 
vision can also see at 20 feet. A person having 20/70 vision can read 
at 20 feet, letters readable by a normal person at 70 feet. Thus the 
standard is, on the surface, merely a relative standard.
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At the other end of the vision circuit, the legibility of traffic signs 
is defined simply by the height of the letters and the size of the sign 
which must be used in certain areas. This is the method employed in 
the Manual for Signing and Pavement Marking of the National Sys­
tem of Interstate and Defense Highways. There is no standard way to 
relate the visual acuity standard to the legibility standard.
Difficulties are thus created. It can be shown by calculation, for 
example, that a motorist having 20/20 vision is able to read signs 
specifying exit speed from the interstate system at a distance of 920 
feet from the sign; whereas, the driver having 20/70 vision cannot 
read the sign until he is only 263 feet from the sign. This driver, if 
moving at legally allowed speed of 60 miles per hour at such a location, 
has three seconds for perception, reaction, and braking which will 
reduce the speed of his vehicle from 60 miles per hour to the posted 
ramp speed of 20 miles per hour. This does not mean that the opera­
tion at these exits is unsafe at all times, because drivers can, in day­
light, see other indications of the need for lower speed. The problem 
does mean, however, that the placement of a sign does not provide 
assurance that it is adequate under the full range of existing drivers 
and speed combinations.
The correction for this difficulty seems rather simple. By going to 
the original definition of visiual acuity according to the Snellen eye 
chart, we find that 20/20 vision also means that letters of a certain 
included angle can be seen at a 20-foot distance. Thus, calculations 
can be employed to develop charts which would interrelate the factors 
of driver visual acuity, speed, and letter size required in signs. The 
charts could then provide a more systematic basis for sign placement. 
It is a simple task, but no one has done it yet on an authoritative level.
Incompatibility of Standards of Windshield Visibility Versus 
Standards of Sign Placement
There are many other problems of this type. It can be shown that 
the standards of windshield visibility in Federal Motor Vehicle Safety 
Standards 103 and 104 are stated in different technical terms than 
standards for placement of signs appearing in the Manual on Uniform 
Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways. The methods of 
definition of the vision capability are stated in angular terms in the 
one standard and in terms of linear dimensions in the other standard. 
Thus, rather difficult calculations are required in order to make an 
analytical placement of a stop line or of the faces of a traffic signal.
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Barrier Characteristics Definition Vs. Definition of Crash Test Objects 
W e are seeing a great deal of effort to produce improved barrier 
systems which will prevent vehicles from striking heavy obstacles along 
the highway. At present, however, the definitions of barrier character­
istics are not related to the definition of crash test objects employed 
in Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards. One result is that ve­
hicles are not actually required to be tested by impacts against any 
of the guardrails or median barriers described in the relevant docu­
ments of the Highway Research Board. This is not yet a problem of 
inadequate communication, but a state-of-the-art problem. This field 
is relatively young and growing rapidly. For example, we still do not 
have a systematic test of the results of crashing trucks into highway 
guardrails. It is easy to see that there should be an objective of merging 
these standards as they are developed so that a true description of 
interrelated system performance would be created.
N O N S Y S T E M A T IC  O R  IN C O N S IS T E N T  STA N D A R D S 
IN E LE M E N TS O F H IG H W A Y  SYSTEM
These examples describe problems with the interrelationship among 
vehicle, highway, and drivers. However, there are many examples of 
nonsystematic or inconsistent standards or specifications occurring en­
tirely within the province of standards agencies in each of the three 
main elements in the highway system. For example, we have highways 
in which the stopping sight distance over a hill is below the distance at 
which a stop can be made at the established speed limit. In the vehicle 
standards field, we find that for typical night speed limits the head­
lights of vehicles do not provide sufficient forward illumination to 
permit a driver to perceive an object, react, and stop before the object 
is reached. There is a clear inconsistency between necessity to dim 
headlights for vehicles in an opposing lane and the need to employ 
one’s own headlights to see objects in one’s own lane. In the field of 
driver definitions, we know that vehicle seating and control arrange­
ments are determined for a given range of drivers’ size, but we do not 
account either in the licensing arrangements or in the qualifications of 
vehicles for those drivers who are outside the range.
W H A T  PROBLEM S O F SYSTEM  D E F IN IT IO N  M E A N  
Uncertainty of System Operating Within Known Safety Margins 
What do such problems of system definition mean in practical 
terms? First, where standards are incompatible, the great difficulty in 
analyzing the interrelationships means that we are not certain that 
the system will actually operate within known safety margins. The
51
margins of operation in which hazards can develop are literally un­
known.
Advanced Development of Highway System Retarded
Second, the advanced development of a highway transportation 
system will be retarded. This consideration is more important than 
it seems because so many of the problems of incompatibility of stand­
ards influence the efficiency of operation as well as the safety of opera­
tion. For example, when a driver suffers from delayed reading of 
traffic signs, he may miss his turnoff on the interstate system and be 
legally required to drive many miles in order to return.
Dependence on Allowing Occurrence of Accidents to Show 
Improvement Needs
Third, incompatibility of standards means that we are dependent 
upon allowing the occurrence of accidents and analysis of the results of 
the accidents to show the need for improvements in existing roads and 
for changes in advanced highway design standards. W e are now placing 
great emphasis upon the maintenance of traffic records and analysis to 
determine high hazard locations and to point out inadequacies of design. 
Yet, it appears that many of the problems revealed by this long-term 
analysis could have been revealed without waiting for accidents to 
occur by means of engineering analysis based upon standards.
N O  C O M P A T IB L E  SYSTEM  STA N D A R D S—
N O SYSTEM S ANALYSIS
The example of the Apollo Project provides perspective. Would 
anyone believe that it would have been possible to design any of the 
major systems or subsystems in the Apollo Project by relying upon 
accident data to prove that a hazard existed? In actual fact there 
has been only one significant accident in the Apollo Project which has 
not been compensated for by system design. Thus, in a very real sense, 
the absence of compatible system standards for highway transporta­
tion prohibits us from employing one of the major modern techniques, 
that of systems analysis.
Inadequate Standards and the Problem of Teaching Highway 
Transportation
This problem of inadequate standards even reaches into the teach­
ing of highway transportation, highway engineering, and automotive 
engineering. In most modern technological systems, the systems ap­
proach is a basic method of organization. Yet, the systems approach is 
not now taught as a practical approach in highway engineering, traffic
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engineering, or automotive engineering. Elaborate data systems and 
business systems are being installed for highway transportation ele­
ments which are not a system. Systems engineering can be used only 
for subsystems in highway transportation.
Major Implications for the Future
The 1969 safety board study of incompatibility of standards pointed 
out the major implications for the future from the continued process 
of development of regulatory standards which are not joined by system 
concepts. Almost every new standard which describes the functional 
operation of a major element in the highway transportation system will 
have to be changed or reinterpreted eventually if we are ever to enjoy 
the benefits of integrated operation in a true highway transportation 
system. W e are constantly producing new standards which describe 
system performance and which are not compatibly related. The task 
of correction is becoming more difficult with every new standard which 
is not analyzed for system compatibility.
Use of Interim Transitional Definitions
The 1969 study of the safety board also included methods for 
dealing with this problem, both in the long and short term. In the 
short term, the safety board proposed the use of what it called, “ Interim 
transitional definitions.” An interim transitional definition might consist 
of the development of charts which would relate Snellen eye test results 
to traffic sign letter heights. It is believed that these interim transitional 
definitions would cover a portion of the problem, but not all of it.
Organization of Standard Producing Institutions
A more significant problem is that of the organization of standard- 
producing institutions which could attack the problem of new compati­
ble standards. The safety board identified about one dozen institutions 
or organizations which substantially affect the development of standards 
and definitions which apply to highway transportation and its elements. 
The board also noted that the Department of Transportation has sig­
nificant capability to encourage compatibility in these standards through 
adoption or nonadoption of the standards in rules, regulations, or as 
a prerequisite for funding. Accordingly, one of the safety board’s 
recommendations to the federal highway administrator (at that time 
responsible for all federal use of these standards) was that he undertake 
the task of leading improved organization of these standards through 
the efforts of the many organizations. The board recommended spe­
cifically a detailed review of the problems of communication and fields 
of responsibility among the agencies.
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An Ad Hoc ComTnittee on Highway System Standards
The Federal Highway Administration has, in accordance with 
these recommendations, a continuing function in one of its offices in 
the form of an ad hoc committee on highway system standards. The 
staff person in charge is Charles Prisk, one of the most experienced 
task force organizers in the Federal Highway Administration.
A D E T E R R E N T  T O  T H E  SYSTEM S A PPRO AC H
I should not close without pointing out also one of the major dis­
advantages in applying the systems approach to present and future 
highway operations. That disadvantage is, strange to say, the very 
strong drive now being made in all government agencies to ensure that 
government efforts are most economically applied. Every agency 
involved with highway safety is seeking to show that the benefits of its 
efforts in accident loss reduction are worth the cost of the effort. Cost/ 
benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis are disciplines sought to be applied 
in the whole process of allocation of funds and efforts. It appears 
however, that this strong drive for efficiency may in some cases tend 
to oppose the application of a full systems approach. The reason is 
that it is far easier to prove that accidents and accident fatalities and 
losses will be reduced by studying the existing accidents, than by 
studying the larger scale disorganization of the system. When high 
accident locations are detectable, for example, it is readily apparent 
that concentrated effort to repair the situation at that location will 
save lives and prevent accidents efficiently. The analytical method of 
proving how attention to system organization will prevent lives from 
being lost more efficiently is much more difficult. W e can, however, 
show by historical example that intense system organization can produce 
almost a perfect safety record. The near-perfect record of the Atomic 
Energy Commission and the excellent record of the Apollo Project 
are examples. The very low fatality record in commercial aviation and 
in rail rapid transit are other examples. W e also know intuitively that 
a highway transportation system which is shaped by the repeated appli­
cation of corrective and repair measures will probably not reach the 
highly efficient status that will be needed. Perhaps the discussion period 
can help to develop some new ideas in meeting this particular problem.
